In this chapter, we discuss a leader-follower (also called Stackelberg) stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. Here the word "asymmetric" means that the available information of the follower is some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader, though they play as different roles in the classical literatures. Stackelberg equilibrium is represented by the stochastic versions of Pontryagin's maximum principle and verification theorem with partial information. A linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information is studied as applications. If some system of Riccati equations is solvable, the Stackelberg equilibrium admits a state feedback representation.
Introduction
Throughout this chapter, we denote by R n the Euclidean space of n-dimensional vectors, by R nÂd the space of n Â d matrices, by S n the space of n Â n symmetric matrices. Á; Á hi and | Á | denote the scalar product and norm in the Euclidean space, respectively. Τ appearing in the superscripts denotes the transpose of a matrix. f x ,f xx denote the partial derivative and twice partial derivative with respect to x for a differentiable function f .
Motivation
In practice, there are many problems which motivate us to study the leader-follower stochastic differential games with asymmetric information. Here we present two examples. Example 1.1: (Continuous time principal-agent problem) The principal contracts with the agent to manage a production process, whose cumulative proceeds (or output) Y t evolve on 0; T ½ as follows:
where e t ∈ R is the agent's effort choice, B represents the productivity of effort, and there are two additive shocks (due to the two independent Brownian motions W,W ) to the output. The proceeds of the production add to the principal's asset y t , which earns a risk free return r, and out of which he pays the agent s t ∈ R and withdraws his own consumption d t ∈ R. Thus the principal's asset evolves as
where y 0 is the initial asset. The agent has his own wealth m t , out of which he consumes c t , thus
Thus, the agent earns the same rate of return r on his savings, gets income flows due to his payment s t , and draws down wealth to consume. In the above σ,σ, σ,σ are all constants. At the terminal time T, the principal makes a final payment s T and the agent chooses consumption based on this payment and his terminal wealth m T . In the above, we restrict y t ,s t ,d t to be nonnegative.
We consider an optimal implementable contract problem in the so-called "hidden savings" information structure (Williams [1] , also in Williams [2] ). In this problem, the principal can observe his asset y t and the agent's initial wealth m 0 but cannot monitor the agent's effort e t , consumption c t , and wealth m t for t > 0. The principal must provide incentives for the agent to put forth the desired amount of the effort. For any s t ,d t , the agent first chooses his effort e 
is maximized. Here r > 0 is the discount rate and λ > 0 denotes the risk aversion parameter.
The above e ; s; d ðÞ ,
where s * ; d * ðÞ is a G 2, t -adapted process pair. This formulates a stochastic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information. In this setting, the agent is the follower and the principal is the leader. Any process quadruple e * ; c * ; s * ; d * ðÞ satisfying the above two equalities is called a Stackelberg equilibrium. In Williams [1] , a solvable continuous time principal-agent model is considered under three information structures (full information, hidden actions, and hidden savings) and the corresponding optimal contract problems are solved explicitly. But it can not cover our model.
Example 1.2: (Continuous time manufacturer-newsvendor problem) Let D Á
ðÞbe the demand rate for a product in the market, which satisfies dD t ðÞ¼a μ À Dt ðÞ ÀÁ dt þ σdW t ðÞþσWt ðÞ ,D0 ðÞ¼d 0 ∈ R,
where a, μ, σ,σ are constants. Suppose that the market is consisted with a manufacturer selling the product to end users through a retailer. At time t, the retailer chooses an order rate qt ðÞfor the product and decides its retail price Rt ðÞ , and is offered a wholesale price wt ðÞ by the manufacturer. We assume that items can be salvaged at unit price S ≥ 0, and that items cannot be stored, that is, they must be sold instantly or salvaged. The retailer will obtain an expected profit 
In the above, we assume that S < M ≤ wt ðÞ≤ Rt ðÞ .
Let F t denote the σ-algebra generated by Ws ðÞ ,Ws ðÞ , 0 ≤ s ≤ t, which contains all the information up to time t. At time t, let the information G 1, t , G 2, t available to the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively, are both sub-σ-algebras of F t .Moreov er ,G 1, t ⊆G 2, t . This can be explained from the practical application's aspect. Specifically, the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price wt ðÞat time t, which is a G 2, t -adapted stochastic process. 
and then to select a G 2, t -adapted process w * Á ðÞfor the manufacturer such that 
formulates a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. In this setting, the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Any process triple q * Á ðÞ; R * Á ðÞ; w * Á ðÞ ðÞ satisfying the above is called a Stackelberg equilibrium. In Øksendal et al. [3] , a time-dependent newsvendor problem with time-delayed information is solved, based on stochastic differential game (with jump-diffusion) approach. But it cannot cover our model.
Problem formulation
Motivated by the examples earlier, in this chapter we study the leader-follower stochastic differential games with asymmetric information. Let Ω; F ; ℙ ðÞ be a complete probability space. 
where u 1 Á ðÞand u 2 Á ðÞare control processes taken by the two players in the game, labeled 1 (the follower) and 2 (the leader), with values in nonempty convex sets U 1 ⊆R, U 2 ⊆R, respectively. x u 1 , u 2 Á ðÞ, the solution to SDE Eq. (13) with values in R, is the state process with initial state x 0 ∈ R n . Here bt ; x; u 1 ; u 2 ðÞ :
ðÞ .
Let us now explain the asymmetric information character between the follower (player 1) and the leader (player 2) in this chapter. Player 1 is the follower, and the information available to him at time t is based on some sub-σ-algebra G 1, t ⊆G 2, t , where G 2, t is the information available to the leader. We assume in this and next sections that G 1, t ⊆G 2, t ⊆F t . We define the admissible control sets of the follower and the leader, respectively, as follows.
The game initiates with the announcement of the leaders control u 2 Á ðÞ∈ U 2 . Knowing this, the follower would like to choose a G 1, t -adapted control u * 1 Á ðÞ¼u * 1 Á; u 2 Á ðÞ ðÞ to minimize his cost functional
Here g 1 t; x; u 1 ; u 2 ðÞ :
ðÞ . Now the follower encounters a stochastic optimal control problem with partial information. In the following step, once knowing that the follower will take such an optimal control u * 1 Á ðÞ¼u * 1 Á; u 2 Á ðÞ ðÞ , the leader would like to choose a G 2, t -adapted control u * 2 Á ðÞto minimize his cost functional
SOCPF. For any chosen
Here g 2 t; x; u 1 ; u 2 ðÞ :
ðÞ . Now the leader encounters a stochastic optimal control problem with partial information.
subject to Eqs. (13) In this chapter, we impose the following assumptions.
(A1.1) For each ω ∈ Ω, the functions b, σ,σ,g 1 are twice continuously differentiable in x; u 1 ; u 2 ðÞ . For each ω ∈ Ω, functions g 2 and G 1 ,G 2 are continuously differentiable in x; u 1 ; u 2 ðÞ and x, respectively. Moreover, for each ω ∈ Ω and any t; x; u 1 ; u 2 ðÞ ∈ 0; T ½ Â R Â U 1 Â U 2 , there exists C > 0 such that
for ϕ ¼ b, σ,σ, and (20)
Literature review and contributions of this chapter
Differential games are initiated by Issacs [4] , which are powerful in modeling dynamic systems where more than one decision-makers are involved. Differential games have been researched by many scholars and have been applied in biology, economics, and finance. Stochastic differential games are differential games for stochastic systems involving noise terms. See Basar and Olsder [5] for more information about differential games. Recent developments for stochastic differential games can be seen in Hamadène [6] , Wu [7] , An and Øksendal [8] , Wang and Yu [9, 10] , and the references therein.
Leader-follower stochastic differential game is the stochastic and dynamic formulation of the Stackelberg game, which was introduced by Stackelberg [11] in 1934, when the concept of a hierarchical solution for markets where some firms have power of domination over others, is defined. This solution concept is now known as the Stackelberg equilibrium, which in the context of two-person nonzero-sum games, involves players with asymmetric roles, one leader and one follower. Pioneer study for stochastic Stackelberg differential games can be seen in Basar [12] . Specifically, a leader-follower stochastic differential game begins with the follower aims at minimizing his cost functional in response to the leader's decision on the whole duration of the game. Anticipating the follower's optimal decision depending on his entire strategy, the leader selects an optimal strategy in advance to minimize his cost functional, based on the stochastic Hamiltonian system satisfied by the follower's optimal decision. The pair of the leader's optimal strategy and the follower's optimal response is known as the Stackelberg equilibrium.
A linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower stochastic differential game was studied by Yong [13] in 2002. The coefficients of the the cost functionals and system are random, the diffusion term of the state equation contain the controls, and the weight matrices for the controls in the cost functionals are not necessarily positive definite. The related Riccati equations are derived to give a state feedback representation of the Stackelberg equilibrium in a nonanticipating way. Bensoussan et al. [14] obtained the global maximum principles for both open-loop and closed-loop stochastic Stackelberg differential games, whereas the diffusion term does not contain the controls.
In this chapter, we study a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. Our work distinguishes itself from these mentioned above in the following aspects. (1) In our framework, the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader. Moreover, both information filtration available to the leader and the follower could be sub-σ-algebras of the complete information filtration naturally generated by the random noise source. This gives a new explanation for the asymmetric information feature between the follower and the leader, and endows our problem formulation more practical meanings in realty. (2) Our work is established in the context of partial information, which is different from that of partial observation (see e.g., Wang et al. [15] ) but related to An and Øksendal [8] , Huang et al. [16] , Wang and Yu [10] . (3) An important class of LQ leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information is proposed and then completely solved, which is a natural generalization of that in Yong [13] . It consists of a stochastic optimal control problem of SDE with partial information for the follower, and followed by a stochastic optimal control problem of forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) with complete information for the leader. This problem is new in differential game theory and have considerable impacts in both theoretical analysis and practical meaning with future application prospect, although it has intrinsic mathematical difficulties. (4) The Stackelberg equilibrium of this LQ problem is characterized in terms of the forward-backward stochastic differential filtering equations (FBSDFEs) which arises naturally in our setup. These FBSDFEs are new and different from those in [10, 16] . (5) The Stackelberg equilibrium of this LQ problem is explicitly given, with the help of some new Riccati equations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we solve our problem to find the Stackelberg equilibrium. In Section 3, we apply our theoretical results to an LQ problem. Finally, Section 4 gives some concluding remarks.
Stackelberg equilibrium 2.1. The Follower's problem
In this subsection, we first solve SOCPF. For any chosen u 2 Á ðÞ∈ U 2 , let u * 1 Á ðÞ be an optimal control for the follower and the corresponding optimal state be x 
holds, for any u 1 ∈ U 1 .
Proof Similar to the proof of 
holds for a:e:t ∈ 0; T ½ , a.s. Then u * 1 Á ðÞis an optimal control for SOCPF.
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3 of [10] , we can obtain the result.
The Leader's problem
In this subsection, we first state the SOCPL. 
For the simplicity of notations, we denote x u 2 Á ðÞx 
where g
Note the cost functional of the leader is also conditional mean-field's type. We propose the stochastic optimal control problem with partial information of the leader as follows. 
Now, we have the following two results. 
Then u * 2 Á ðÞis an optimal control for SOCPL.
Proof This follows similar to Shi [20] . We omit the details for simplicity. □
Applications to LQ case
In order to illustrate the theoretical results in Section 2, we study an LQ leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. In this section, we let G 1, t ≔ σW s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t ÈÉ and G 2, t ¼ F t . This game is a special case of the one in Section 2, but the resulting deduction is very technically demanding. We split this section into two subsections, to deal with the problems of the follower and the leader, respectively.
Problem of the follower
Here, u 1 is the follower's control process and u 2 is the leader's control process, which take values both in R; A, C,C,
In the first step, for announced u 2 , the follower would like to choose a G 1, t -adapted, square-integrable control u * 1 to minimize the cost functional
In the second step, knowing that the follower would take u * 1 , the leader wishes to choose an F t -adapted, square-integrable control u * 2 to minimize
where Q 1 ,Q 2 ,G 1 ,G 2 ≥ 0,N 1 ≥ 0,N 2 > 0 are constants. This is an LQ leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. We wish to find its Stackelberg equilibrium u *
Define the Hamiltonian function of the follower as
For given control u 2 , suppose that there exists a G 1, t -adapted optimal control u * 
where the F t -adapted process triple q; k;k ∈ R Â R Â R satisfies the BSDE , u 2 T ðÞ :
We wish to obtain the state feedback form of u * 1 . Noting the terminal condition of Eq. (38) and the appearance of u 2 , we set
for some deterministic and differentiable R-valued function Pt ðÞ , and R-valued, F t -adapted process φ which admits the BSDE dφ t ðÞ¼α t ðÞ dt þ β t ðÞ dWt ðÞ , φ T ðÞ ¼ 0:
In the above equation, α ∈ R, β ∈ R are F t -adapted processes, which are to be determined later. 
respectively. Taking E ÁjG 1, t ½ on both sides of Eqs. (39) and (42), we get
and 
which recovers the standard one in [22] . With Eq. (49), the BSDE Eq. (40) takes the form 
which admits a unique 47) is really optimal. We summarize the above procedure in the following theorem. ; b φ; b β is the unique G 1, t -adapted solution to Eq. (55).
Problem of the leader
Since the leader knows that the follower will take u * 
where ; b φ; b β can be easily guaranteed.
The problem of the leader is to choose an F t -adapted optimal control u * 2 such that the cost functional
is minimized. Define the Hamiltonian function of the leader as
Suppose that there exists an F t -adapted optimal control u * 2 of the leader, and the corresponding optimal state is 
where the F t -adapted process p; y; z;z ðÞ satisfies dp t 
In fact, the problem of the leader can also be solved by a direct calculation of the derivative of the cost functional. Without loss of generality, let x 0 0, and set u * 2 þ εu 2 for e > 0 sufficiently small, with u 2 ∈ R. Then it is easy to see from the linearity of Eqs. (56) and (60), that the solution to Eq. (56) is x * þ ex u 2 . We first havẽ
Let the F t -adapted process quadruple p; y; z;z ðÞ satisfy Eq. (60). Then we have
Applying Itô's formula to x u 2 t ðÞ ; yt ðÞ hi À pt ðÞ ; b φ t ðÞ hi , noting Eqs. (56) and (60), we derive. 
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This implies Eq. (59).
In the following, we wish to obtain a "nonanticipating" representation for the optimal controls u * 2 and u * 1 . For this target, let us regard x * ; p ðÞ Τ as the optimal state, put
and (suppressing some t below) 
Noting Eq. (59), we have
Inserting Eq. (68) 
where
We need to decouple Eq. (69). Similar to Eq. (39), put
where P 1 t ðÞ , P 2 t ðÞ are differentiable, deterministic 2 Â 2 matrix-valued functions with 
Applying Itô's formula to (3.31), we get
Comparing dW t ðÞand dWt ðÞon both sides of Eq. (73), we have
Taking E ÁjG 1, t ½ , we derive
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Supposing that (I 2 denotes the 2 Â 2 unit matrix)
we get
hi ' ,
Inserting Eq. (77) into Eq. (74), we have
Supposing that 
where. 
Comparing the coefficients of dt in Eq. (73) and putting Eqs. (77) and (81) into them, we get 
where b X is governed by 
We summarize the above analysis in the following theorem.
